Introduction
It is commonp[ace to bemoan the EU's democratic deficiencies, as attested to by the wea[th of [iterature discussing the issue from a variety of perspectives. This chapter is not a [iterature review. To the contrary, it advances my own view on the issue, a[beit one that is informed by existing scho[arship. The ensuing ana[ysis is predicated on the assumption that a principal, a[beit not exclusive, cause for concern about EU democracy is the mismatch, or absence of fit, between voter power and political responsibility.
EU decision-making is structured such that voters cannot determine the shape or direction of EU policy in the manner that occurs to a greater extent within Member States. It is not, therefore, possible in the EU for the electorate to remove the incumbents from office, and replace them with a different political party that has a different set of policies. It is this malaise that underlies Wei[er's critique of EU decision-making, captured in aphorismic terms by his affirmation of the centrality to democracy of the voters' ability to 'throw the scoundrels out1]. It is the same malaise that informs Maduro's critique, to the effect that the 'real EU democratic deficit is the absence of European politics], manifest in the lack of democratic political contestation about the content and direction of EU policy. Properly understood these are but two sides of the same coin.
The ensuing discussion takes the same starting point as Wei[er and Maduro. The direction of travel thereafter is, however, rather different, insofar as we are concerned with explanation and understanding of the status quo. The assumption, explicit or implicit, in much of the literature is that the fault for this malaise resides with the EU. The pattern of thought seems strikingly simple, shaped by the very cadence of language. This is most marked in the duality of meaning accorded to the phrase the 'EU's democratic deficit', which is used descriptively to capture the malaise adumbrated above, and deployed normatively to connote the fact that the fault resides with the EU, which is regarded as architect and author of present reality.
The academic line of argument pursued thereafter flows naturally from the preceding duality of meaning. Given that the democratic shortcoming resides descriptively and normatively with the EU, democracy must therefore remain in the Member States, which are said to be the principal sites for democratic legitimation. Some of the literature on 'demoicracy' is grounded, in part at least, on such assumptions. The discussion that follows takes issue with this descriptive and normative linkage, and hence with the conclusions drawn therefrom.
It wi[[ be argued that the preceding linkage does not withstand examination. Insofar as there is a democratic deficit of the kind identified above, it flows from choices made expressly and repeatedly by the Member States over time as to the institutional structure for decision-making which they are willing to accept. These choices could have been different. There is no a priori block in this respect. There is, to the contrary, no especial difficulty in devising an EU decisionmaking regime that would meet the democratic shortcomings outlined above. The EU itself is not blameless with respect to the mode of decision-making, and nothing in the present chapter is predicated on that assumption. Improvements could doubtless be made in the manner in which the principal EU institutions operate. This does not alter the fact that that the Treaty architecture that frames their respective powers, and the way in which they inter-relate, is the result of Member State choice, made and re-made since the inception of the Community.
It wi[[ also be argued that there are, however, four constraints to a fit between the EU's institutional decision-making structure, and the precepts of democracy. The constraints are political, democratic, constitutional and substantive. The political constraint is predicated on the assumption that some form of parliamentary majoritarian regime would meet the democratic deficit articulated above, thereby ensuring a closer nexus between voter preferences and political responsibility. Change of the kind that would meet the democratic infirmity thus conceived is, however, very unlikely to occur, because the Member States wi[[ not accept it for the reasons explicated below. The democratic constraint is expressive of the fact that there is contestation as to whether such a parliamentary-type regime really is the most appropriate model for a polity such as the EU, or whether a different form of democratic ordering would be better suited. The constitutional constraint denotes the fact that EU decision-making is limited by the very nature of the constituent Treaties. National constitutions constrain political choice. It is inherent in their very nature. The EU is no different in this respect in principle, in the sense that the founding Treaties form the architecture to which legislation made thereunder must conform. The difference is one of degree, but it is significant nonetheless, since the EU Treaties are far more detailed than any national constitution, and hence the room for democratic policy choice is more circumscribed. The substantive constraint speaks to the democratic consequences of the imbalance between the economic and the social within the EU, as manifest in the original Treaties, and as a consequence of the EU's financial crisis.
Institutional Structure and Democracy: The Past
The Community may only be 60 years old, but it is nonetheless easy to forget its institutional origins, and the conception of democracy that existed, or not as the case maybe, at the outset. The reality was that the original disposition of power in the Rome Treaty saw little role for direct democratic input. The Assembly was accorded limited power, and its only role in the legislative process was a right to be consulted where a particular Treaty article so specified.
The principal institutional players were the Council and Commission, but in many respects the Rome Treaty placed the Commission in the driving seat in the development of Community policy. The Commission had the right of legislative initiative; it could alter a measure before the Council acted; its measurers could only be amended by unanimity in the Counci[; it devised the overall legislative agenda; and it had a plethora of other executive, administrative and judicial functions. The message was that, while the Council had to consent to proposed legislation, it was not easy for it to alter the Commission's proposal. The Commission might therefore have become something akin to a 'government' for the emerging Community The same genera[ institutional structure was to be carried over to the EEC: 'enlightened administration on behalf of uninformed publics, in cooperation with affected interests and subject to the approval of national governments, was therefore the compromise again struck in the Treaties of Rome'N. While Monnet favoured a democratic Community 'he saw the emergence of loyalties to the Community institutions developing as a consequence of elite agreements for the functional organization of Europe, not as an essentia[ prerequisite to that organization.'M Neofunctiona[ism was to be the vehicle through which Community integration, conceived of as technocratic, elite-led gradualism, combined with corporatist style engagement of affected interests, was to be rea[ised. Neofunctiona[ism fitted neatly with Monnet's perception of the Community. Monnet and neofunctiona[ists also shared the same sense of legitimacy and democracy. For Monnet, and like-minded followers, the legitimacy of the Community was to be secured through outcomes, peace and prosperity. The ECSC was established in part to prevent a third European war. The EEC was created in large part for the direct economic benefits of a common market. Peace and prosperity were potent benefits for the people in the 1950s. Democracy was, by way of contrast, a secondary consideration, since it was felt that the best way to secure peace and prosperity was by technocratic elite-led guidance.
Institutional Structure and Democracy: The Present
Prognostication as to the future is perilous at the best of times, more especial[y so in relation to an institution such as the EU. Exogenous shocks external to the EU, which are unforeseen and unforeseeable, can shatter the very best reasoned predictions. Endogenous change from within the EU can, in similar vein, disrupt future visions that would otherwise be p[ausib[y grounded, as attested to by the Catalonia problem in Spain, and electoral change in the Czech Republic, Austria and Ita[y. While prediction is, therefore, fraught with difficulty, a necessary condition for any such exercise is to be cognizant of the rationale for the status quo. To forget the lessons of history is to invite repetition of past mistakes, or it is to predicate views as to future institutional change on assumptions that are unsustainab[e when viewed in historical perspective. The significance of this will be apparent in the ensuing discussion, which is premised on the institutional disposition of power that current[y prevails.
Space precludes detailed ana[ysis of the passage from the initial institutional division of power in the Rome Treaty, to the schema embodied in the Lisbon Treaty[ 1 "]. Readers will be familiar with this, and reference will be made to it in the subsequent ana[ysis. Suffice it to say for the present that the EP increased its power within the decision-making process. This occurred initial[y through the co-operation procedure, introduced by the Single European Act 1986, and then through the co-decision procedure in the Maastricht Treaty, as further strengthened by the Amsterdam Treaty. The EP attained something approximating to co-equal status in the legislative process with the Council, as later recognized by the Lisbon Treaty.[ 1 1 ' The European Council, as the ultimate repository of Member State power, also came to exercise an ever-increasing role in the decisionmaking process, de facto and dejure, which was affirmed and strengthened in the Lisbon Treaty. [ 12] The legal and political rea[ity, as reflected in the Lisbon Treaty, was an institutional decisionmaking process in which state interests still predominated, and in which, notwithstanding the increase in the EP's power, the voters could not direct[y affect a change of po[icy direction in the EU by removing the incumbents and replacing them with those espousing different policies.
The Brexit discourse was conducted explicit[y against the status quo, and implicit[y against assumptions concerning ascription of responsibi[ity for the existing schema. Thus the ills of the EU, whatsoever they might current[y be, were conceived to be the responsibi[ity of the EU, viewed in this respect primari[y, but not so[ely, as the Commission, together with other 'powers' in Brussels. This is a great story, save for the fact that it bears little relation to rea[ity. What is missing is considered discourse concerning the constitutional responsibi[ity of the Member States for the status quo. This is readi[y apparent in relation to the inter-institutional division of power within the EU. It is common[y acknowledged that the democratic deficit is a prominent feature of the EU's [egitimacy problem, with the attendant implication, as noted in the introduction, that it is not just a problem that besets the EU, but is the EU's fault. It is the EU qua real and reified entity that suffers from this infirmity, the coro[[ary being that blame is cast on it. The EU is not blameless I10] P Craig, 'Institutions, Power and Institutional Balance', in P Craig and G de Burca (eds) The Evolution of EU Law (Oxford University Press, 2nd edn, 2011) Ch 3. 7
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in this respect, but nor are the Member States, viewed collectively and individually. This is not to deny the existence of problems in this regard, the disjunction between political power and electoral accountability being an important facet of the democracy deficit argument ["] .
It is to ask who bears responsibility for the status quo. This is all the more surprising given the 
Institutional Structure and Democracy: The Future -Four Constraints
The preceding backdrop is a necessary condition for making plausible suggestions concerning the future disposition of inter-institutional power in the EU. It might be argued that reforms could alleviate the existing democratic disjunction between electoral power and political responsibility, and that the change whereby the Commission President was indirectly elected by reason of being the candidate of the party that secured most seats in the European Parliament is a natural pointer in this direction. This could provide the foundation for true democratic contestation, whereby voters would be offered alternative political agendas for the EU, and their votes would truly determine the policy path for the next five years.
This could in theory happen. There are a range of democratic solutions available. It does not require some new master-plan of arrangements hitherto unknown to the world of democratic political architecture. A pretty-detailed schema, premised on some form of parliamentary democratic regime, could be sketched out. Thus, to take one possible way forward, it would be possible to have a regime in which the people voted directly for two constituent parts of the legislature, the European Parliament and Council, and for the President of the Commission and the President of the European Council. It would be possible in theory to have the previous package, but only a single elected President for the EU as whole. It would be possible for the entire Commission to be reflective of the majority party in the EP, and not just the President of the Commission. It would be possible for the EP to have a right of legislative initiative in tandem with that of the Commission. It is possible to devise such a schema with conditions devised to protect against undesirable consequences of majoritarianism. The linkage between electoral power, substantive policy choice and accountability would be more visible and it would be strengthened. There are necessary qualifications to this type of mode[, which wi[[ be addressed in the section on democratic constraints below, but it provides a useful starting point for discussion.
(a) Political Constraints

(i) Member States
The principal reason why nothing akin to the preceding mode[ is likely to occur is that Member States are the main architects of Treaty change and they have never been willing to accept such a disposition of power. We must, as noted above, remember the past when planning the future. It is true that the choice between two Presidents and a single President for the EU was debated during the negotiations leading to the Constitutional Treaty. It is equally true that discourse concerning the election of the Commission President began in the 1980s. The broader reforms adumbrated above were not, however, on the political agenda during the extensive negotiations concerning institutional power in 2003-4 that led to the Constitutiona[Treaty, nor in the subsequent discussions that culminated in the Lisbon Treaty.
The reason why nothing akin to the preceding mode[ has ever appeared in formal discussion of Treaty reform is not hard to divine. The Member States would lose power in relative and absolute terms. They would no longer be masters of the treaty. The preceding mode[, or something akin thereto, would alleviate the democratic deficit as conceived in the preceding sense, but in doing so it would endow the elected majority in the EP, and the duly elected Presidents of the Commission and European Council, with a mandate and an authority to discharge the promised electoral pledges. This would be a fortiori so if the members of the Council were also directly elected. Such a regime would inevitably significantly circumscribe Member State room for manoeuvre. It would create a substantive path dependency as to the direction of policy, and the priorities to be fulfilled.
It is, therefore, unsurprising that nothing akin to this has featured in serious political deliberations concerning the direction of institutional change within the EU. Viewed from this perspective, the democratic concession in the 2015 EP elections, known as the Spitzenkandidaten process, whereby the Commission President was imbued with greater legitimacy, because he was supported by the dominant political party, and canvassed as its candidate, could be accepted by the Member States because it did not fundamentally change the status quo ante. It did not create a path dependency towards a political agenda that committed the EU to a particular substantive set of reforms. It did not substantially undermine Member State power to set the pace and content of the EU agenda from within the European Council, and the Council. Moreover, the very fact that the other members of the Commission continued to be chosen by the Member States perforce limited the extent to which the Commission President, of whatever political persuasion, could shape the political agenda.
The preceding point is reinforced by the fact that the Member States have refused to confirm the continued application of the Spitzenkandidaten process in the 2019 elections [17] . The formal legal reality is that the European Council is only obliged to take account of the result in the European elections, when it proposes its candidate for Commission President to the European Parliament [18] . The European Parliament then votes on the candidate. The Commission and the EP, not surprisingly, pressed for the continuation of the Spitzenkandidaten process, arguing that it would increase public interest in EU affairs, and thereby augment the democratic legitimacy of the outcome. The Member States were, however, resistant to continuation of the schema, in part because the evidence indicated that only 5 per cent of voters went to the polls to influence the choice of Commission President, with little if anything to show in terms of increased voter turnout. They were also resistant to continuation of the 2015 regime on the ground that while it would strengthen the linkage between the Commission and the EP, this could damage the democratic legitimacy of the Commission President. The argument was that the Spitzenkandidaten system robbed the Commission president of the 'dual legitimacy' that would otherwise flow from approval by the democratically-elected national leaders in the European Council, followed by that of the EP. While the European Council cannot, in formal terms, prevent the EP from operating the Spitzenkandidaten process, they can refuse to accept the candidate of the winning party as automatic incumbent of the office of Commission President. This would, moreover, accord the Member States further leverage ex ante, in the sense that they could influence who is nominated as a candidate by the EP political parties. States showed no appetite for this suggestion in the deliberations leading to the Constitutional Treaty, and their position in this respect has not altered in the interim. Member State control is evident yet again in the reluctance to move towards a smaller Commission, which would mean that not every state would have a Commissioner all the time. While Commissioners do not formally represent their country, the Member States are, nonetheless, reluctant to give up their own national in the Commission decision-making process. It is paradoxical that these outcomes are occurring when the UK is set to leave the EU, since the UK would applaud the reaffirmation of Member State voice in EU decision-making.
Member State opposition to reforms of the kind being considered here would, moreover, not be confined to the executive branch of government. The same sentiment would be voiced by some national Parliaments, which would not view with equanimity such institutional architecture, since it would be regarded as increasing the EU's legitimacy at the expense, inter alia, of national parliaments. Thus, while it suits the agenda of some political groupings in national parliaments to critique the EU's democratic credentials, they would, nonetheless, be resistant to change that alleviated such concerns, if it thereby enhanced the EU's democratic legitimacy by providing the linkage between electoral power and political responsibility, with the consequence that the authority of national parliaments was thereby diminished.
The diminution of state power that would be entailed by change of the kind mooted above would, moreover, be constitutionally challenged in some countries, on the ground that the EU was truly becoming a super-state. Thus, while the German Federal Constitutional Court has repeatedly chided the EU in relation to its democratic credentials, it would likely be one of the national constitutional courts to decide that an institutional configuration of the kind set out above, which addressed the democratic deficit as present[y understood, would not be compatible with German constitutional law. This was because such a change would mean that the EU was moving closer to a federal state, with the consequence that the Member States could no longer be regarded as the Masters of the Treaty in the manner hitherto.
The political constraints on alleviating the democratic deficit have been exacerbated by the rise in populism in some Member States. This is not the place to engage in discourse concerning the meaning, and causes of, populism [19] . That would require a paper or book in itself, and it would not be possible to do justice to the complexities of the argument in the context of this chapter. Suffice it to say the following for the present. Whatsoever one's views concerning the meaning and causes of populism, the effect thereof has been to render states more suspicious of 'external' authority, and less inclined to accept choices that are not in accord with their own preferences. It is debatable whether this is an a priori consequence of populism, although it probably is. It is, however, certainly a contingent consequence, so far as concerns the effect of populism in EU Member States. Given that this is so, such Member States are less likely to accept changes to the institutional architecture of EU decision-making which would diminish their power over the direction of EU policy. to explain the attention given to voting rules and other mechanisms designed to alleviate this problem in the EU.
I'll
It is important, therefore, to view proposals to alleviate the EU's democratic deficit against the preceding backdrop. The reality is that such proposals entail a reordering of the hierarchy in the modes of representation as they pertain in the EU. Representation of the people is afforded elevated status, as manifest in the desire that voter choice be translated into political action, such that the gulf between electoral power and political responsibility is eradicated or significantly diminished. This necessarily involves reduction in the power wielded by the institutions that represent state interests.
It might be argued by way of response that this reba[ancing is precisely what is intended, to which the counter is that the states are unlikely to accept the substantive path dependency and loss of power that would be attendant on this change. It might, alternatively, be argued that alleviation of the democratic deficit can be accomplished without the reba[ancing adumbrated above, to which the answer is that such an argument must be fleshed out to test its institutional and substantive veracity.
Concerns of an analogous nature have been expressed by Scharpf[ 21 ], who argues that an unqualified majoritarian system would be problematic in the EU. He points out that constitutional democracies, such as Switzerland, Belgium or Canada, in which there is societal division, combined with structural majorities and minorities, often resort to 'consociationa[' or 'consensus democracy' with bicameral legislatures, supermajoritarian decision rules and the like to protect the interests and of minority groups. While it is contestable whether the EU is characterized by the persistent, reinforcing cleavages that prevail in such countries, there is little doubt that some qualifications to majoritarianism would be required[ 22 ].
Present decision rules could of course be modified in some ways, perhaps to relax the Commission's monopoly of legislative initiatives. But they could not be replaced by a regime of straightforward majority rule without provoking disruptive political conflicts and radical anti-European opposition in Member States whose national politico-economic and socioeconomic orders and values could be overridden by explicitly political decisions adopted by majorities of 'foreigners' in the European Parliament (EP) and in the Council. In other words, the explicit switch to majority rule would destroy the protection of persistent minorities that is presently ensured by the Community Method. And it could po[iticise European legislation in ways that might transform the largely dormant 'no-demos issue' of EU legitimacy into conflicts that could destroy the Union. The EU Treaties fulfil many of the functions of national constitutions, specifying matters such as the inter-institutional distribution of power, the mode of law-making, and the respective competence of the EU and Member States. They also go significantly beyond the remit of national constitutions, with the consequence that a wide range of matters becomes constitutiona[ized and taken off the agenda of normal politics. The effect of this is further enhanced by the constitutional doctrines of direct effect and supremacy, which transformed the four economic freedoms from 'objective principles for legislation into subjective rights of the market participants who could claim them against the Member States before the national courts ' [29] .
(c) Constitutional Constraints
This in turn meant that there were two modes of EU integration. The Treaty precepts could be advanced through legislation enacted by the EU institutions, or they could be taken forward through judicial decisions, which were imbued with considerable force through direct effect and supremacy [30] . Member States had limited influence over the latter, and this was particularly important since the lack of differentiation between the constitutional law [eve[ and the ordinary law [eve[, meant that the 'constitutiona[ization of the treaties immunises the Commission and particularly the ECJ against any attempt by the democratically responsible institutions of the EU to react to the Court's jurisprudence by changing the law' [31] . For Grimm, the remedy was to limit the EU Treaties to their truly constitutional elements and downgrade other Treaty provisions that were not constitutional nature to the status of secondary law.
(ii) Competence: Vertical and Horizontal Dimensions
Constitutiona[ization is not the only constitutional constraint on political choice. It is also limited by the competence accorded to the EU. Political choices placed before the electorate in nation states are paradigmatica[[y predicated on the state having plenary power. The assumption is that, subject to constitutional limits, the rival political parties can place before the electorate a range of options, which cover economic, social and political issues, broadly defined. This is the very lifeblood of normal politics, with contestation concerning matters such as economic redistribution, social welfare, health, crime and education, featuring prominently on the electoral agenda. There is a vertical and a horizontal dimension to such [imitations on competence as they pertain to the EU.
The most obvious dimension of competence is on the vertical plane, insofar as it demarcates the respective spheres of authority of the EU and the Member States. It follows that, even assuming the Member States were willing to alleviate the democratic deficit by embracing political reordering of the kind set out above, the choices that rival political parties could place before the electorate are framed by the limits of EU competence. It is not, therefore, open to a political party to promise far-reaching change in social welfare or economic redistribution, since the EU does [ Ibid 467.
[30]J Weiler, 'The not have competence over such matters, nor does it have the tax base from which to effectuate such change, the EU still being principally a regulatory state in this regard. It is, moreover, not open to a political party to promise far-reaching change on matters that are of prime concern to voters in national elections, such as education, health, crime and the like, since the EU's powers are limited in such areas.
There is, however, a less obvious dimension of competence that resonates horizontally, insofar as it frames the exercise of political choice by the EU institutions when making EU policy. This is the consequence of the fact that not a[[ heads of competence are created equal. The EU's power over different areas varies significantly, being dependent in part on whether the competence is exclusive, shared or complementary, and in part on the fact that even within each such category it is only by looking closely at the relevant Treaty provisions that one can determine the real scope of EU power. There is therefore no 'boi[erp[ate' that determines the nature of power possessed by the EU in the diverse areas that fa[l within, for example, shared competence. The horizontal dimension to competence is, moreover, manifest in the fact that the Treaties specify to some significant degree the hierarchy of substantive provisions, as attested to most notably by the dominance of the four freedoms. This perforce shapes the political choices that the EU institutions are able to make.
There are, moreover, instances where there is a mismatch between the expectations of what the EU is expected to do, and the limits of the competence accorded to it, as powerfully exemplified by the rule of law crisis. This may, in the medium term, prove to be the most serious of the crises faced by the EU. There is a rich and sophisticated literature on the topic, which explores the limits of the powers currently available to the EU, and how they could be applied[ 2 ]. There is, moreover, a duality to the concept of national constitutional responsibility as it pertains to the rule of law crisis most especially in Poland and Hungary. There is the fact that the principal responsibility for the crisis resides with the states that introduced the illiberal measures threatening the rule of law.
There is the secondary responsibility that lies with the Member States collectively, as reflected in the Treaty provisions, which give expression to the limits of the controls over Member State action that they are willing to accept. The terms of Article 7 TEU set the parameters for such action, and are predicated on the assumption that there wi[[ not be more than one misbehaving state at any point in time. The reality is that the EU is caught between a rock and a hard place, or if you prefer more classical illusions, between Scylla and Charybdis: it risks being damned for doing too little, criticized for being ineffectual; or criticized for trying to do too much, and thereby straying into the terrain of domestic politics where it lacks competence. 
(d) Substantive Constraints
The fourth constraint on exercise of democratic political choice is substantive. It is related to the constitutional constraint, but distinct nonetheless, and hence warrants separate consideration. The balance between the economic and the social has been a contentious feature of the EEC since its inception, and continues to be so. It is manifest in two ways.
(i) The Economic and the Social: Core Treaty Provisions
Scharpf has long argued that the EU embodies an asymmetry between the economic and the social, such that the former is prioritized at the expense of the latter ["] . He contends that the EU is premised on asymmetrical treatment of the economic and social spheres. The economic order has predominated, as evidenced by the Treaty provisions, and the primacy accorded to completion of the single market, with the attendant priority placed on market and competitive principles. Scharpf argued that it would have been possible, when the Rome Treaty was framed, to have made harmonization of social protection a pre-condition for market integration, given that the welfare regimes of the original six Member States were relatively rudimentary and closer than they have since become. The doctrines of direct effect and supremacy heightened these constraints. Scharpf argues that the Member States failed to recognize the impact of these twin doctrines, which [aid the foundations for integration through law, whereby the Community courts could advance Treaty objectives if integration through legislation was not possible because of disagreement in the Council [ "] . Negative integration through judicial decisions that deemed national laws to be inconsistent with theTreaty, became the dominant mode of integration, until the new mode of harmonization was introduced post the Single European Act 1986, thereby facilitating positive integration.
There came to be increasing pressure for the EU to play a greater role in social policy, thereby alleviating the constitutional imbalance between the market-making and market-correcting functions of a polity. This goes much of the way to explain the inclusion of more There were, moreover, persistent efforts in the latter part of the previous millennium to recast the single market in more ho[istic terms, so as to include aspects of social and labour policy ["] .
Scharpf argued that it was not, however, possible at the turn of the millennium for the EU to adopt the stance towards social policy that it had declined to take when the Rome Treaty was signed. It was not possible to treat social welfare and protection through uniform rules applicable to all, because of the very diversity in welfare systems that existed within the Member States This was the rationale in part for the development of social policy through the Open Method of Coordination [8] .
Political parties and unions promoting 'social Europe' are thus confronted by a dilemma: to ensure effectiveness, they need to assert the constitutional equality of social protection and economic integration functions at the European [eve[-which could be achieved either through European social programmes or through the harmonization of national socia[-protection systems. At the same time, however, the present diversity of national social-protection systems and the political salience of these differences make it practically impossible for them to agree on common European solutions. Faced by this dilemma, the Union opted for a new governing mode, the open method of coordination (OMC), in order to protect and promote social Europe.
These arguments are important. The following points are, however, pertinent in this context. First, insofar as there is an imbalance between the economic and the social within the EU, this is the result of Member State choice, just as is the current institutional structure. It is of course true that judicial doctrines of direct effect and supremacy, as developed by the c] EU, have heightened this tension, but the fact remains that the centrality accorded to the four freedoms, and the relative weakness of the social as compared to the economic dimension, is reflective of what the Member States have been willing to accept, and the powers that it has been willing to accord, to a supranational polity. There is a paradox lurking here. The desire to preserve national sovereignty underpinned Member State reluctance to accord the EU power over social policy; yet the resulting predominance of the economic over the social within the EU impacted on Member State freedom to choose the balance between the economic and the social within the nation state.
Secondly, there is no doubt that legal doctrines of direct effect and supremacy sharpened the cutting edge of the four freedoms, thereby further enhancing the economic dimension of the Treaties, and the attendant negative integration resulting from the judicial doctrine. Scharpf's argument, to the effect that the Member States were not cognizant of the significance of the legal doctrine, should, nonetheless, be viewed with caution. Member States benefited from such judicial doctrine, insofar as it invested the Treaties, and rules made thereunder, with a peremptory force that they would otherwise have lacked. To put the same point in another way, these doctrines, as enforced by the EU courts, gave greater credibility to the commitments embodied in the Treaties. [371 Scharpf, 'The European Social Model (n 33) 649-51.
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(ii) The Economic, the Social and the Political: EMU and the Financial Crisis
The financial crisis impacted significantly on the balance between the economic and the social, and more broadly on the political structure of decision-making in the EU. There is force in the preceding arguments. Thus, it is assuredly correct that the Commission has discretion pursuant to various regulations enacted post the financial crisis. The salient regulations were, however, approved through the ordinary legislative procedure, with significant input from the EP as we[[ as the Council, although the room for parliamentary involvement thereafter is limited[ 48 ]. It is, moreover, important not to be asymmetrical in this respect. It is the executives of the Member States that are very much in the driving seat when it comes to setting their national budget. They commonly exercise considerable discretion in this regard, such that it is difficult to ensure parliamentary accountability. There may be reasons why the national executive is willing to tolerate significant budgetary imbalance, or feels powerless to address the issue. This can in turn have serious consequences for other Member States, through the strain thereby placed on the euro. The existence of Commission discretion should, therefore, be viewed in this light.
The post-financial crisis legislative schema is, moreover, premised on such Commission discretion, coupled with increased provision for national budgetary targets that can be policed by national legislatures more readily than hitherto.
Institutional Structure and Democracy: The Paradox
There is a paradox of cause and effect in the EU's inter-institutional configuration of power as it presently exists, and as it likely to remain in the future. The cause captures the facts as set out hitherto. The Member States have shaped the present configuration of EU inter-institutional power, which is beset by a democratic deficit insofar as there is scant connection between electoral vote and political power or responsibility, such that it is difficult for the voters to express a view as to the direction of EU policy that will be translated into action. Member States bear the principal responsibility for the status quo, since they devised the current schema.
The effect captures the way in which we think about democratic legitimation in the EU. The infirmities in EU decision-making constitute the driver for the argument that EU legitimacy and democracy must be grounded in the Member States, not merely as one mode of representation within the EU. The argument becomes more 'viscera[ and foundational', in the sense that it is the Member States, and the national parliaments therein, that are regarded as the true bedrock of democracy. Their claims in this regard are grounded in the EU's democratic deficiencies, and this in turn is used to fuel the argument that such parliaments should participate in EU decision-making. because of the effect that this could have on their own power. Thus, while 'a true political Union would involve not suppressing, but channelling and promoting meaningful conflict over the EU's substantive goals'[ 49 ], and while reinvigoration in this respect may be especially pertinent post the financial crisis, there is scant likelihood of this occurring.
It should be made clear that nothing in the preceding argument presumes the idea of a single demos for the entire EU; it is not predicated on the denial of plurality in the political choices made by the EU; it does not rest on assumptions of a particular kind of federal order or anything akin thereto; it presumes no particular distribution of power between the EU and the Member States; and it is perfectly consistent with a role for national parliaments.
The paradox is, by way of contrast, simply reflective of the politics concerning the disposition of inter-institutional power as it has unfolded since the inception of the EEC. It is reflective also of normative assumptions as to the type of Community or Union that the Member States are willing to create, and the powers that they are content to invest in it. The enduring paradox persists: Member State refusal to allow institutional change that would alleviate the democratic deficiency in EU decision-making remains a principal cause of the malaise, the consequential effect being that the problem can only be addressed at state [eve[.
The paradox is a[[ the more important because it comes with a 'political bite', which is doubly undermining for the EU. Member States prefer to off-load blame concerning deficiencies in EU decision-making to the EU institutions themselves, and divest themselves of responsibility. They do not readily concede their role as institutional architects of the status quo. It is, moreover, these very institutional deficiencies that serve to rob the EU of the legitimacy that it requires to tackle difficult social or economic issues. The EU is caught between a rock and a hard place, berated in equal measure for its over-attachment to the economic at the expense of the social, while castigated for lacking the democratic legitimacy to make dispositive social or redistributive decisions.
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